



## Fire Department Report, October 2020

In September, the Department responded to 26 calls for service; 7 Medical, 5 unauthorized burning, 7 Mutual Aid Fires, 2 Motor Vehicle Accidents, 2 Power Lines Down, 1 Cover assignment for Bay City, 1 Fire Danger Investigation, and 1 Citizen Complaint. The Department completed a total of 735 hours in the month of September. The Hours break down as follows; 427 Response, 145 training, and 155 administrative.

### **Volunteer Activity and Status:**

We are still critically short of volunteers. We are trying to recruit, but are still having a difficult time getting volunteers in the door. Our personnel level is the lowest I have seen it in about 15 years.

Firefighter Jacob Griffith volunteered 85 hours, Firefighter David Stacey volunteered 77 hours, Lieutenant Gingerich volunteered 69 hours, and Captain Kapiniak volunteered 66 hours last month. Additionally we had 4 volunteers with more than 30 hours, and 2 volunteers with more than 20 hours for the month.

### **Training Program:**

Training was stalled for most of the month with the fire activity, but we were still able to log about 145 hours of meaningful fire training. We are continuing to roll out our new online training vendor.

In light of recent events, we will be conducting more NIMS ICS training as well as officer development toward a deeper Officer's corps.

**Administrative:**

In September, I worked a total of 193 hours in the station, meetings, and responding to calls for service.

We continue to adjust our Department to meet the ever changing conditions of both the pandemic as well as our volunteer availability.

**COVID-19 Emergency**

We are continuing to adjust to current guidance, including Or. OSHA's proposed temporary and permanent rules.

We currently have sufficient PPE, Supplies, and Equipment in inventory for our current operational tempo.

We are continuing to document PPE use and Patient/Responder contact in the hope we may reduce exposure vectors for our volunteers and the public.

The ongoing mask mandates continue to create pressure within our ranks as we work our way past when to wear a mask and when not to. This remains a work in progress and a sort of balancing act. However, we will continue to focus on the safety of our responders and community.

**Permits, Development, and Fire Life Safety:**

Permits remain lite as of this report. We are noticing many locations with land use and life safety issues within the City.

I toured the City with Councilor Imhoff and identified a few of my concerns.

I will reach out to the Director Markee once has had a chance to settle in a bit and discuss some of my code enforcement concerns.

**Fire Season:**

Fire season has ended as of October 10<sup>th</sup>, and burning is once again allowed with a burn permit.

**Emergency Management:**

The recent Fire and Weather Event has identified a few weaknesses in our planning and response to a large event. I think it is time for the City Council to assign an emergency manager or at least a Councilor to coordinate the implementation of the City's Emergency Response Plan. In the recent fire and weather event we went from weather and fire watch to all hands on deck in 10 minutes. I wrote the attached SWOT analysis to explain my take away from the recent event(s)

Bottom line is that we should have initiated the City's Emergency Operations Plan as the weather materialized and before the actual event occurred. This would have placed us in a position of having our City's EOC operational as decisions were being made about evacuation levels within our City.

**Fire Protection Continuity:**

I met with the Chiefs of our neighboring Fire Agencies, and we will be meeting again to discuss a larger framework for possible options for fire protection within Bay City and the Tillamook Bay Area.

Our next meeting will be to discuss the results of Garibaldi's steering committee from a few years ago. We would like to come up with a list of solutions to several issues facing our various fire agencies. After we have identified issues and some solutions, we will invite representatives from the various governing bodies to participate in forester discussions.

I will keep you posted.

**Recruiting:**

We remain critically short of Volunteers. If you have ever been interested in becoming a volunteer firefighter, or know of any possible candidates please let us know.

Respectfully,

Darrell Griffith

Fire Chief

Bay City Fire Department

503 377-0233

[firedept@ci.bay-city.or.us](mailto:firedept@ci.bay-city.or.us)

Date	D=Drill, OM= Officer's MTG, T=train n = No Points	Call Type	Anderson Karl	Bentley, Aaron	Brennan, Shannon	Chambers, Trent	Gingerich, Joshua	Griffith, Darrell A	Griffith, Darrell M	Griffith, Jacob	Harris, David	Huseby, Jace	Kapiniak, Jon	Nelson, Cutter	Reid, Christopher	Sigman, Bridget	Stacey, David	Wakefield, James Jr	Wakefield, Timothy			
9/5/2020	D		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2			2				2					
9/16/2020	D		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2			2		2	2	2	2				
9/23/2020	D		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2			2		2	2	2					
9/30/2020	D		2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2			2		2	2	2					
9/5/2020	OM						1		1				1									
9/16/2020	OM						1		1				1					1				
9/23/2020	OM			1			1		1				1									
9/30/2020	OM			1			1		1				1									
EMR Class					16												32					145
on line training				2	2		2						2									
9/1/2020	C	Med					1		1	1			1									
9/3/2020	D	Unath Burn							1													
9/5/2020	C	Med							1	1			1									
9/5/2020	D	Unath Burn							1	1												
9/6/2020	C	MVA	1		1		1		1	1			1				1					
9/6/2020	C	MA-71-F	3				3		3	3												
9/7/2020	C	MA-71-F					12		12	12		12	12			12	12				12	
9/8/2020	C	Power lines						0	0	0												
9/8/2020	C	Power lines						0	0	0												
9/8/2020	C	MA-71-F					0	9	0	0		0		9			0					
9/9/2020	C	MA-71-F		1			1		1	1							1					
9/9/2020	C	MA-71-F	6	15	3		16	6	16	16	6		16		14	16	16	6				
9/10/2020	D	41 cover	10	10			10		10	10			4		10							
9/10/2020	D	Fire Inv		0					0													
9/13/2020	C	Med	1				1		1	1							1					
9/14/2020	C	MA-91-F	3		1		3	3	3	3	1	1	3	1		3	3					
9/16/2020	D	Unath Burn					1			1			1									
9/19/2020	D	Unath Burn					1															
9/22/2020	D	Complaint							1													
9/23/2020	C	Med	1				1		1	1			1									
9/25/2020	C	Med	1						1	1			1									
9/25/2020	C	MVA					1		1	1							1					
9/26/2020	D	Unath Burn					1															
9/27/2020	C	Med					1		1	1						1						
9/27/2020	C	MA-61-F			1		1		1	1			1									
9/29/2020	C	Med							1	1			1									
																						427
Station/Meetings									124	20			9				2					
Hours			32	36	30	6	69	26	193	85	7	13	66	10	28	36	77	9	12			735
% of calls																						
Min Drills			y	y	y	y	y	NA	y	n	n	y	n	n	y	y	n	n				
W/C #			y	ac	y	y	y	fc	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y			15
RATE			EL	A.Chief	Applicar	LT	FF1	N/A	EMR	EL			OPS	Applicar	FF1	EL	Capt.	Lt.				
Stipend amount			20	500	0	0	50	25	N/A	20	0	0	400	0	0	25	20	0	0			1060
Point @ \$5 ea			13	12	11	0	25	9	N/A	28	3	4	21	4	0	21	24	4	3	182		910
Duty @ \$50				0.00			9.75		N/A				2.50					0.00	0.00			612.50



Response by Bay City Fire, SWOT analysis of Sept 2020 Fire and Weather event.

Mon 9/07 about 2200 hrs

Fast running brush fire HWY 101 and Idaville Rd.

41-50 & 41-68 POV, 41-13 Crew of 5, 41-12 Crew of 2

Fire Extinguished and 41-13 remained on scene until 0245 re wind driven flare ups..

Power lines Down 12 and E, Tillamook and Watt Family Park.

41-45 with crew of 3 investigated both calls. PUD notified of power lines down, lines were still energized at this time.

SWOT:

**Strengths:** Tillamook Fire quickly requested our assistance. 8 People, and 2 apparatus responded relatively quickly.

**Weakness:** Communication: Fire TAC 2 overwhelmed with multiple calls. Switch to non-repeated TAC 5 not possible until our second engine was on scene re limitation of TAC 5. No pump and roll capability. Required progressive hose lay of 1" Hose.

**Opportunity:** Training to recognize mass incidents and initiate move up of additional resources (Could have called for Garibaldi Fire)

Fire OPS (in the Communication Center) received and held reports of power lines down in Bay City, resulting delayed response.

**Opportunity:** Training for use of our Structural engines as tender when no water supply available in adjoining areas. Equip our Structural engines to supply tenders from hydrants. Develop pump and roll capabilities with our brush engine. (Communication Center use appropriate ICS/NIMS organization so that changes in dispatch procedures do not result in a delay or a single person responsible for response decisions) (City, Could have already activated EOP and had EOC ready to ramp up if calls started coming in.)

**Threats:** This Fire took us right to our limit, and the Weather Conditions meant we had no margin for error. Incidents in Bay City were delayed by confusing dispatch protocol or practice.

Tue 9/08

Pike road, Request for Structure Protection and initial attack.

41-45 responded with crew of 3 wildland PPE.

41-12 responded with crew of 4 structural protection, Structural PPE.

Both units assisted with initial attack and remained on scene until 0750hrs.

**Strength:** 1 type 6(Brush Pump) with crew of 3 all Wildland type 2 trained and equipped. 1 Structural Engine, Officer/Engineer and 3 FFs all in Structural Turnouts. Additional personnel in district for coverage.

**Weakness:** Communication, Fire personnel on several TAC channels, ODF and some Fire personnel on ODF REDNET. IC not clearly defined. Almost felt like 2 separate operations. Structural Fire and ODF Fire. Our initial attack crews remained on scene for several

hours after they were needed. This time could have been more efficiently used to rehab crews and equipment for the next operational period. We also found that we were not supplied with sufficient nutrition for this extended event. We had Water, but that was it.

**Opportunity:** Develop specific guidelines for our Fire Personnel's involvement within the initial attack of a Wildland, and Wildland Urban Intervention Fire. Train Officers to communicate the need for a clearly defined Command on every incident. Absent a command structure, our Officers will initiate Command and begin establishing an ICS structure to support the level of incident we are participating in. Train all personnel to wildland FF type 2, and Wildland Urban Interface Firefighter at a minimum. Begin Training the Officers corps in more specific ICS levels, Target 300-400 and command and general staff functions.

**Threats:** We ignored watch outs and LCES. Crews were sent into the fire and not supervised. Inter unit communications remained viable, however, we were not sure of who was in command, and who our supervisor(s) were during the incident. Our structural crew was used in more of an initial attack role even though they were in structural gear.

Tue 9/08

0800

Rehab apparatus and personnel. We cleaned hose and re equipped apparatus for the next event.

SWOT:

**Strengths:** All personnel on both event remained to assist. Rolling rack assisted with equipping and refitting some of the fire hose.

**Weaknesses:** Officer's and FFs were tired and no clear command was established. Some required functions were missed. 41-12 was not filled with water, fuel not topped off. Not enough 1 ¾" hose to full restock engine 12.

**Opportunities:** increase hose inventory 200' more 1 ¾" and 150' of 2 ½" for a complete swap of 2 small fires. Purchase our own 1" hose to allow for 45 to be more easily refitted. Identify, Recruit, and train more volunteers.

**Threats:** Available personnel extremely fatigued.

Tue 9/08

Monitor Activity, Rest and Rehab for Responders.

Wed 9/09

0630

Paged to a possible Structure Fire in Tillamook and Cancelled Enroute.

0700

Evacuations and Structural protection. While clearing from the above call, we began overhearing emergency requests for assistance with regard to the Pike road fire. Upon

hearing that the Area east of Bay City would be evacuated, I requested an all call page be initiated for Bay City Fire Personnel. 41-45 responded to the area East of Bay City and conducted a door to door evacuation. Waltz hills road, Baseline Rd to Bewleys, and Seattle Ave again to Bewleys.

Station 41 was manned by several volunteers, and 41-13 was assigned to structural protection on the Pike Rd. Fire. We initiated our Department Operations Center as per the City of Bay City EOP. The remaining staff in Station 41 equipped and staffed a task force to respond to calls for service as well as to monitor fire conditions within Bay City and respond should any spot fires begin to approach the city. We also placed engine 41-12 back into service, including a cache of wildland fire hose, appliances, and nozzles. Additionally, several community members volunteered equipment and manpower should it be need to protect Bay City. We ultimately staffed 41-45 as a BLS rescue and wildland fire response, and Engine 41-11 as Structural response.

We eventually responded to a Cover assignment in Tillamook as well as 2 Fires in Tillamook. In addition, we conducted fire watch of the area east of Bay City via overlook on Waltz hills road. This Operational period lasted until 2300, 16 hours.

SWOT:

**Strengths:** Volunteer response of a total of 12 Volunteers who provided between 3 and 16 hours each. Equipment profile. Reserve Apparatus designated to wildfire support. Outpouring of support from Citizens, including food, water, and beverages. Support of Citizens with offers of equipment and personnel for firefighting and structural protection. Communication with Bay City Public Works.

**Weakness:** Unknown command structure. Evacuation orders and levels, including The City Limits of Bay City that occurred without any communication with the Government of Bay City, or Myself. Communication (Fire OPS) Simplex vs Repeated channels, and ODF channels. We were also funneling all communication at our level through, "Fire OPS", at 911. Once I received the land line number for the Fire Ops desk, I was able to communicate to that position when needed. I found that the single person manning the position was overwhelmed. City, no activation of City's Emergency Operations Plan.

**Opportunity:** County Design, Train, and Exercise a County wide Emergency Operations Plan following NIMS/ICS guidance. Ensure an Overhead Chief (Fire Chief) staff the County EOC. Fire Manage County Wide Fire Resources if and when we are all involved in large scale events. City, Prioritize and Exercise our Emergency Operations Plan, including activation of Emergency Operations Center.

**Threats:** We were in real danger of falling behind the information curve as well as fire conditions. Water supply, Bay City Public Works and PUD had a tough time getting permission to respond to a reservoir power outage in the Willowbrook Neighborhood. At a couple of times during this event, I was told that Bay City's Task Force was the only un-assigned fire resource in the area. Misinformation, The evacuation orders and levels were handled *recklessly*, I often found out about changes and upgrades via concerned and sometimes irate citizens that were contacted via Facebook Posts and messages from Emergency Management. Even the Press conferences by Emergency Management, and Elected Officials were conducted without notice to responders and incident managers, and often contradicted published information.



Wed 9/09- Thurs 9/10

A few of us slept at Station 41 and manned the station for calls overnight.

Thurs 9/10

We manned Station 41 with 6 personnel on Thursday in a relatively quiet day as crews continued to work the Pike Road Fires and Evacuations were ended. We manned the station for 10 hours.

Overall SWOT:

**Strengths:** (Bay City Fire) 16 volunteers responded with approximately 400 hours during this event. Equipment and PPE, We were well equipped, including a reserve apparatus that had been equipped to support wildfire operations before this incident. Aggressive suppression of first fire, and ability to respond to second Fire on Pike road and assist in initial attack. PPE, members equipped with wildland PPE, including boots that had just been purchased.

(Bay City Public Works) Public Works Lead Bettis remained in nearly constant contact with the Fire Department beginning with the initial wind event and into the Fire Events. Bettis also maintained contact with me regarding our water supply status throughout the incident(s).

(Tillamook Fire) Structure, Command, Personnel, and Equipment to respond to numerous incidents at once. Aggressive initial Attack and integration of ODF. Quick request for assistance by other Fire Agencies. (Tillamook County Fire Agencies) Multi Apparatus response by all of Tillamook County's Fire Departments and Oregon Department of Forestry.

**Weaknesses:** (Bay City Fire) Volunteer shortage limited our ability to staff our station in a stand by positions while initial responders were sleeping. We need about 6 or 7 more active volunteers, including more Officers and Driver/Operators. Training Additional Wildland and Wildland Urban Interface training for our volunteers. Incident command, ICS, and Communication training to use all of our capabilities up to a type 3 incident. Radio training to use our radios programmed capabilities, including the ODF channel bank that is programmed into all of our operational radios. Equipment Additional Wildland capabilities for 41-45 to pump and roll if possible. Equip engines with hydrant gates to support tender operations when we will take a hydrant and leave the equipment behind for use by other department's tenders. Rehab supplies, nutrition, insufficient to cover the extremely long shift duration in these incidents.

(City of Bay City) Failure to implement our City's EOP upon identification of the threatening weather event, and implementing a City EOC once Wind and Fire events started.

**Opportunity:** Training as described above. And inclusion of additional equipment as described above. (Bay City Fire) This event brought the need to incorporate more communication capability into our department, namely Tablets and Active 911 services. These capabilities would have allowed for instant mapping and resource tracking for our agency. Conduct more training with other Public Safety agencies including large scale

event planning and exercises. Conduct water supply training with Tillamook and Garibaldi Fire to assist when we will be called outside of our routine water supply operations to support rural water supply requirements.

(City of Bay City) Training and exercising our Emergency Operations plan, including communicating during disasters and large scale events. Train all Departments in using radios during emergency events.

**Threats:** Public Information Handled totally inappropriately by County Leadership Team. We literally had to assign someone to monitor Face Book in case someone in the County Leadership team decided to post information before we were aware of it. Command was strained as we were facing an unknown command structure. A couple of times during this incident, I pulled back resources and readjusted our response protocol when I was unable to ascertain who was in command of incident and Large Scale planning. The, "County Leadership Team", created a Fire Operations Position in the communication center. I felt that this created a position where one individual was acting as a Dispatcher and several other command and general staff positions by himself. This was a huge departure from ICS and NIMS Standards and presented a considerable safety concern. My concern was that we were not strategically planning and managing resources for the possible fire conditions rather than just reacting to the small picture Pike Road event. This coupled with the Public Information Breakdown forced Bay City Fire to create a taskforce outside of the larger command structure to ensure we could respond to additional public safety threats beyond the Pike road fire.

**Conclusion:** The Fire Departments, Law Enforcement Agencies, Public Works Departments, Oregon Department of Forestry, and Many other Local Agencies and Individuals responded to unprecedented weather and fire events, and through a herculean effort initial attacks held the fire to a small enough footprint that local resources were able to finally control the situation. It is my desire that we use this near miss to improve our local ability to respond to these type of incidents in a more efficient and safe manner. The Fire Defense Board, Law Enforcement, and Oregon Department of Forestry have already begun discussing moving in the direction of an integrated Incident Management Team for future events.

Respectfully,

Darrell Griffith  
Fire Chief, Bay City Fire Department.